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ABSTRACT 
 
I start with some famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig 
Wittgenstein because Pinker shares with most people (due to the default settings of 
our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices about the functioning of the 
mind, and because Wittgenstein offers unique and profound insights into the 
workings of language, thought and reality (which he viewed as more or less 
coextensive) not found anywhere else. There is only reference to Wittgenstein in 
this volume, which is most unfortunate considering that he was the most brilliant 
and original analyst of language. 
 
In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully 
summarizes the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, 
intentional psychology) –a product of blind selfishness, moderated only slightly by 
automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our genes (Inclusive 
Fitness)--works automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us hope 
that we can nevertheless employ its vast capabilities to cooperate and make the 
world a decent place to live. 
 
Pinker is certainly aware of but says little about the fact that far more about our 
psychology is left out than included. Among windows into human nature that are 
left out or given minimal attention are math and geometry, music and sounds, 
images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things or what we know), most of 
epistemology (how we know), dispositions (believing, thinking, judging, intending 
etc.) and the rest of intentional psychology of action, neurotransmitters and 
entheogens, spiritual states (e.g, satori and enlightenment, brain stimulation and 
recording, brain damage and behavioral deficits and disorders, games and sports, 
decision theory (incl. game theory and behavioral economics), animal behavior 
(very little language but a billion years of shared genetics). Many books have been 
written about each of these areas of intentional psychology. The data in this book 
are descriptions, not explanations that show why our brains do it this way or how 
it is done. How do we know to use the sentences in their various way (i.e., know all 
their meanings)? This is evolutionary psychology that operates at a more basic level 
–the level where Wittgenstein is most active. And there is scant attention to the 
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context in which words are used = an arena which Wittgenstein pioneered. 
 
Nevertheless, this is a classic work and with these cautions is still well worth 
reading. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
“If God looked into our minds he would not be able to see there whom we were 
thinking of.” Wittgenstein PI p217 
 
“Ought the word “infinite” to be avoided in mathematics? Yes: where it appears to 
confer a meaning upon the calculus; instead of getting one from it.” RFM revised 
edition (1978) p141 
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set it 
in relief—but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself in the 
very fact that language can and only does refer to it. For since language only derives 
the way in which it means, its meaning, from the world, no language is conceivable 
that does not represent this world.” Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks S47 
 
 “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” TLP 
 
I start with these famous comments by the philosopher (psychologist) Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (W) because Pinker shares with most people (due to the default 
settings of our evolved innate psychology) certain prejudices about the functioning 
of the mind and because Wittgenstein offers unique and profound insights into the 
workings of language, thought and reality (which he viewed as more or less 
coextensive) not found anywhere else. The last quote is the only reference Pinker 
makes to Wittgenstein in this volume, which is most unfortunate considering that 
he was the most brilliant and original analysts of language. 
 
Another famous Wittgensteinian dictum is “Nothing is Hidden.” If one dips into 
his work sufficiently, I think he makes it very clear what this means—that our 
psychology is in front of us all the time if we only open our eyes to see it and that 
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no amount of scientific work is going to make it clearer (in fact it just gets more and 
more obscure). This is not antirational or antiscientific but it just states what he sees 
as the facts—a soccer game is out on the field –not in our head--and we understand 
perfectly well the motivations, anxieties, stresses and disappointments of the 
players and what effort is required to play and how the ball moves when kicked. 
Immense advances have been made in sports physiology, anatomy, bioenergetics, 
physics math and chemistry. Whole books full of equations have been written about 
how balls move thru the air and muscles apply force to move bones; about how 
muscle movements originate in part of the cortex, are mirrored in the brains of 
others; mountains of literature on motivation, personality, brain function and 
modeling. Has this given us any more insight into a soccer game or changed our 
strategy or our experience of playing or watching? 
 
Intentionality (rationality) has been evolved piecemeal from whatever tools (genes) 
animals had to work with and so is full of paradoxes and illusions. Just as we see 
mirages in the desert or read words into sentences that are not there, and see 
animated blobs on a screen “causing” others to move and “helping” or 
“hindering”’, we look for thinking and believing in the head and confuse our innate 
psychological axioms with empirical facts (e.g., regarding math and geometry as 
things we “discover” in the world, rather than invent). 
 
In order for the concept and word “reality” to apply to the results we get from the 
use of differential equations, MRI scanners and particle colliders to a greater degree 
than or in place of apples, rocks and thunderstorms, it would be necessary for these 
recent discoveries to have had the same role in natural selection over hundreds of 
millions of years. It is only survival advantage over eons that selected the genes 
enabling our distant (invertebrate) ancestors to begin reacting in useful ways to the 
sights and sounds of the world and ever so slowly to produce brains that could form 
concepts (thoughts) that eventually were verbalized. Science and culture cannot 
replace or take preference over our ancient intentional psychology but merely 
slightly extends or supplements it. But when philosophizing (or doing linguistics!) 
we are easily misled as context is missing and our psychology automatically 
dissects every situation for the causes and the ultimate or lowest level of 
explanation and we substitute that for the gross higher levels because there is 
nothing in our language rules to prevent it. It comes ever so naturally to say we 
don’t think—our brain does and tables are not solid because physics tells us they 
are made of molecules. But W reminded us that our concepts of, and words for, 
thinking, believing and other dispositions are public actions, not processes in the 
brain, and in what sense are molecules solid? Hence, the quote above, which bears 
repeating, since I see it as one of the most fundamental ideas we have to get clear 
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about before we can make any progress in the study of behavior. 
 
“Time and again the attempt is made to use language to limit the world and set it 
in relief—but it can’t be done. The self-evidence of the world expresses itself in the 
very fact that language can and only does refer to it. For since language only derives 
the way in which it means, its meaning, from the world, no language is conceivable 
that does not represent this world.” 
 
Much of W’s writing is examples of the common-sense knowledge that is essential 
to the success of all animal behavior and by and large not only the behavioral 
science but even AI, which cannot succeed without it, has been unable to grasp and 
implement it. Even one of the fathers of AI, Marvin Minsky said (in a 2003 Boston 
Univ. speech) that “AI has been brain dead since the 70’s” and lacked common sense 
reasoning. But his recent book “The Emotion Machine” still shows no awareness of 
the work that W did 75 years ago, and this means no awareness of the contextual, 
intentional, point of view without which one cannot hope to grasp how the mind 
(language) works. 
 
When talking about behavior (i.e., thought or language or action) it is a nearly 
universal mistake to regard the meaning of a word or sentence as attached to it, 
ignoring the infinite subtleties of context, and thus we go astray. Of course, we 
cannot include everything about context, as that would make discussion difficult, 
even impossible, but there is a vast difference between regarding meaning as 
something that can be fully given by a dictionary entry and meaning as shorthand 
for a family of complex uses. Even Klein’s classic book ‘Time in Language’ (not cited 
by Pinker) regards  ‘time’ as a family of loosely connected uses, though of course he 
too has no awareness of W, Searle or intentionality. 
 
The point of mentioning this is that Pinker shares the reductionistic biases of most 
modern scientists and that this colors his approach to behavior in ways that will not 
be obvious to most readers. As fascinating as his data are and as masterful as his 
writing is, it subtly leads us to what I think is a mistaken picture of our 
psychology—a view that is due to the innate biases of our evolved psychology and 
hence is a universal failing. 
 
Pinker is the Richard Dawkins of psychology—one of the major popularizers of 
science in modern times. Possibly only the late and most unlamented (he was a self-
serving egomaniac who misled millions with his specious reasoning, Neomarxism 
and blank slateism) Stephan Gould sold more volumes of pop sci. It was Pinker’s 
masterful refutation of the universal delusion that human nature is culturally 
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generated (one of Gould’s many delusions) that made his previous book ‘The Blank 
Slate’ a classic and a top choice for most important books of the 21st century. 
Incidentally, there are many put-downs of Gould, including some by Pinker and 
Dawkins (“he has made tilting at windmills into his own personal art form” –as I 
recall it from a Dawkins review of a Gould tome from the Journal ‘Evolution’ a 
decade or so ago), but I think the best is that of Tooby and Cosmides in a letter to 
the NY Times (search their page or the Times). All of these works are intimately 
connected by the subject of animal behavior, evolutionary psychology, and of 
course ‘The Stuff of Thought”. 
 
Following convention, Pinker discusses Putnam’s famous, but badly flawed, twin 
earth thought experiment (bizarre thought expts. in philosophy were essentially 
invented by Wittgenstein), which claims to show that meaning is not in the head, 
but it was W in the 30’s—i.e., 40 years earlier-- who showed decisively that all the 
dispositions or inclinations (as he called them, though philosophers, lacking 
acquaintance with his work commonly call them by the incorrect name of 
propositional attitudes) including meaning, intending, thinking, believing, judging 
etc. function as descriptions of our actions and not as terms for mental phenomena. 
They cannot be in the head for the same reason a soccer game cannot be in the head. 
Later in life Putnam began to take Wittgenstein seriously and changed his tune 
accordingly. 
 
He makes almost no reference to the large and fascinating literature on behavioral 
automatisms (i.e., most of our behavior! --see e.g., “Experiments With People’(2004) 
or Bargh’s ‘Social Psychology and the Unconscious’ (2007) for the older work, and 
“Dual Process Theories of the Social Mind’ by Sherman eta al (2014) and the vast 
and rapidly expanding literature on implicit cognition), which shows that the more 
you look, the clearer it becomes that actions which we regard as results of our 
conscious choice are not. People shown pictures or reading stories of old people 
tend to walk out of the building slower than when given those of young people etc. 
etc. The well-known placebo effect is a variant where the info is consciously input—
e.g., in a 2008 study eighty-five percent of volunteers who thought they were getting 
a $2.50 sugar pill said they felt less pain after taking it, compared with a 61 percent 
control group. Such effects can be induced subliminally if the price info is input via 
images, text or sound. Presumably the same is true of most of our choices. 
 
This brings us to one of my major gripes about this book—it’s monomaniacal 
obsession with the “meaning” of words rather than their use-- a distinction made 
famous by W in his lectures and some 20 books beginning in the 1930’s. Like W’s 
insistence that we do not explain behavior (or the rest of nature) but only describe 
 6 
 
it, this may seem like a pointless quibble, but, as usual, I have found as I reflected 
on these matters over the years that W was right on the mark. He said that a formula 
which will work most of the time is that the meaning of a word (far better to say a 
sentence) is its use in language—and this means its public use in a specified context 
to communicate info from one person to another (and sometimes to another higher 
mammal—dogs share a major portion of our intentional psychology). I mention this 
partly because in a previous book Pinker accused W of denying that animals have 
consciousness (an extraordinary view that is actually defended by some) because 
he noted that a dog can’t think “perhaps it will rain tomorrow”, but W’s point was 
the unexceptional one that there are many thoughts that we cannot have without 
language and that we have no test for interpreting a dog’s behavior as showing that 
it expected something tomorrow. Even if it used an umbrella and invariably got it 
out of the closet the day before a rain, there is no way to connect this to it’s mental 
state—same for a deaf mute who could not read or write or use sign language. This 
connects to his famous demonstrations of the impossibility of a private language 
and to the fact that dispositions are not in the head. W showed how the absence of 
any public test means that even the dog and the mute cannot know what they are 
thinking—nor can we, because dispositions are public acts and the act is the 
criterion for what we thought—even for ourself. This is the point of the quote 
above—neither God nor neurophysiologists can see thoughts, beliefs, images, 
hopes in our brain, because they these are terms for acts and neither the vague and 
fleeting epiphenomena we experience, nor the correlates detectable by brain 
studies, function in our life in the same way as do the contextual use of the sentences 
describing these acts. And, regarding animal consciousness, W noted that 
intentional psychology gets a foothold even in a fly—a point marvelously and 
increasingly supported by modern genetics, which shows that many genes and 
processes fundamental to primate behavior got their start at least as early as 
nematodes (i.e., C. elegans) some billion years ago. 
 
Intentional psychology or intentionality (very roughly our personality or rationality 
or higher order thought (HOT) is a very old philosophical concept that (unknown 
to most) was given its modern formulation by Wittgenstein, who, in the 20,000 
pages of his nachlass, now mostly translated and published in some 20 books and 
several CDROM’s, laid the foundations for the modern study of human behavior. 
Sadly, he was mostly a recluse who did not publish for the last 30 years of his life, 
never really finished writing anything of his later work and wrote his brilliant and 
highly original comments on behavior in a style variously termed epigrammatic, 
telegraphic, oracular, Socratic, obscure etc. and all published posthumously over a 
period of more than 50 years (the famous Philosophical Investigations (PI) in 1953 
and the most recent-but not the last!—The Big Typescript in 2005) and thus, though 
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he was recently voted one of the top 5 philosophers of all time, and Philosophical 
Investigations  the most important philosophy book of the 20   century, he is ignored 
or misunderstood by nearly everyone. The feeling I often get is that our psychology 
is a coral reef with most people snorkeling on the surface admiring the bumps while 
Wittgenstein is 20 meters below probing the crevices with scuba gear and flashlight. 
 
Wittgenstein’s literary executors were stuffy academics and his books issued mostly 
from Blackwell with staid academic titles and no explanation whatsoever that they 
can be seen as a major foundation for the modern study of evolutionary psychology, 
personality, rationality, language, consciousness, politics, theology, literature, 
anthropology, sociology, law etc., –in fact everything that we say, think and do 
since, as he showed, it all depends on the innate axioms of our evolved psychology 
which we share to a large extent with dogs, and to some extent even with flies and 
C. elegans. Had his works been presented with flashy covers by popular presses 
with titles like How the Mind Works, The Language Instinct, and The Stuff of 
Thought, much of the intellectual landscape of the 20 century might have been 
different. As it is, though he is the major subject of at least 200 books and 10,000 
papers and discussed in countless thousands more (including Pinker’s How the 
Mind Works), based on the hundreds of articles and dozens of books I have read in 
the last few years, I would say there are less than a dozen people who really grasp 
the significance of his work, as I present it in this and my other reviews.  However 
the recent publications of Coliva, DMS and others, and perhaps mine, should 
change this. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their 
analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
 
One result of all this (what one philosopher has called “the collective amnesia 
regarding Wittgenstein”) is that students of language including Pinker take Grice’s 
notions such as implicature (which seems just a fancy word for implication) and, 
more recently, relevance theory, as a framework for “the relation between words 
and meaning” (of course W would turn in his grave at this phrase, since how can 
they be separable from their use if one follows his meaning is use formula?), but 
they seem to me feeble substitutes for intentionality as described by W and revised 
and enlarged by Searle and others. In any case, Grice is the normal soporific 
academic, Sperber (a leader in relevance theory) tolerable, Pinker engaging and 
often elegant and even poignant, Searle (see esp. ‘Rationality in Action’) is clear, 
rigorous, and quite original (though owing, I think, a very big debt to W,) but too 
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academic for the bestseller lists, while Wittgenstein, once you grasp that he is a 
natural master psychologist describing how the mind works, is very demanding, 
but brilliantly original and often breathtaking. Pinker writes masterful prose while 
Wittgenstein writes telegrams, though often moving and poetic ones and on a few 
occasions, he wrote beautiful essays. Pinker can be mined for some gold, lots of iron 
and some dross while W is mostly gold, a little iron and hardly a speck of dross. 
Pinker is mostly summarizing the work of others (though in impeccable style) while 
W is so original and so bizarre he’s way over most people’s heads. I suggest reading 
Pinker, Searle and Wittgenstein alternately or simultaneously with a dash of 
Sperber, Grice and a few hundred others from time to time. 
 
W said that the problem is not to find the answer, but to recognize that which is 
always before us as the answer. That is, our language is (by and large) our thought, 
which is about actual or potential events (including actions by agents such as 
barking, speaking and writing), and that meaning, contra Pinker and a cast of 
thousands, is use, and nothing is hidden (i.e., language is -mostly- thought). 
 
The ignorance in many quarters is so complete that even an otherwise marvelous 
recent 358 page book by Wiese on a topic virtually created by Wittgenstein 
(Numbers, Language and the Human Mind—which I see is cited by Pinker) there 
is not a single reference to him! 
 
W mostly emphasizes the different uses of the “same” words” (i.e., a splitter) who 
originally wanted to use the quote “I’ll teach you differences!” as the motto of his 
book PhilosophicaI Investigations. That is, by describing the different uses of 
sentences (the language games), and by modifying the games in thought 
experiments, we remind ourselves of the different roles these games play in life and 
we see the limits of our psychology. But Pinker, again following the seductive 
defaults of our evolved modules and the egregious examples of thousands of others, 
is a lumper who often blurs these differences. E.G., he speaks repeatedly of “reality” 
as though it was a single thing (rather than a whole family of uses). He also speaks 
of reality as something separate from our experience (i.e., the classic idealist/realist 
confusion). 
 
But what test is there for reality? He slips (as do we all) so easily into the 
reductionistic substitution of lower levels for higher ones so we are all inclined to 
dismiss the thinking that we can see (i.e., actions) for processes in the brain, which 
our language (thought) can not possibly be describing, as it evolved long before 
anyone had any idea of brain functions. If Pinker imagines that you are not really 
reading this page (e.g., your retina is being hit with photons bouncing off ink 
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molecules etc.) then I respectfully suggest he needs to reflect further on the issue of 
language, thought and reality and I know of no better antidote to this toxic meme 
than immersion in Wittgenstein. 
 
Reflecting on Wittgenstein brings to mind a comment attributed to Cambridge 
Philosophy professor C.D. Broad (who did not understand nor like him), which ran 
something like ‘Not offering the chair of philosophy to Wittgenstein would be like 
not offering the chair of physics to Einstein!” I think of Wittgenstein as the Einstein 
of intuitive psychology. Though born ten years later, he was likewise hatching ideas 
about the nature of reality at nearly the same time and in the same part of the world 
and like Einstein nearly died in WW1. Now suppose Einstein was a suicidal 
homosexual recluse with a difficult personality who published only one early 
version of his ideas that were confused and often mistaken, but became world 
famous; completely changed his ideas but for the next 30 years published nothing 
more, and knowledge of his new work in mostly garbled form diffused slowly from 
occasional lectures and students notes; that he died in 1951 leaving behind over 
20,000 pages of mostly handwritten scribblings in German, composed of sentences 
or short paragraphs with, often, no clear relationship to sentences before or after; 
that these were cut and pasted from other notebooks written years earlier with notes 
in the margins, underlinings and crossed out words so that many sentences have 
multiple variants; that his literary executives cut this indigestible mass into pieces, 
leaving out what they wished and struggling with the monstrous task of capturing 
the correct meaning of sentences which were conveying utterly novel views of how 
the universe works and that they then published this material with agonizing 
slowness (not finished after half a century) with prefaces that contained no real 
explanation of what it was about; that he became as much notorious as famous due 
to many statements that all previous physics was a mistake and even nonsense and 
that virtually nobody understood his work, in spite of hundreds of books and tens 
of thousands of papers discussing it; that many physicists knew only his early work 
in which he had made a definitive summation of Newtonian physics stated in such 
extremely abstract and condensed form that it was impossible to decide what was 
being said; that he was then virtually forgotten and that most books and articles on 
the nature of the world and the diverse topics of modern physics had only passing 
and usually erroneous references to him and that many omitted him entirely; that 
to this day, half a century after his death, there were only a handful of people who 
really grasped the monumental consequences of what he had done. This, I claim, is 
precisely the situation with Wittgenstein. 
 
It seems crushingly obvious that our evolved psychology has been selected to match 
the world to the maximal extent compatible with our genetic and energetic 
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resources and that is ALL we can say about reality, and we ALL understand this 
(we LIVE it) but when we stop to think about it, the defaults of our universal 
psychology take over and we start to use the words (concepts) of “reality,” 
“aspects,” “time,” “space,”, “possible,” etc. out of the intentional contexts in which 
they evolved. The following gem comes from biologists (I take it from 
Shettleworth’s superb but neglected book Cognition, Evolution and Behavior). 
 
“The role of psychology then is to describe the innate features of the minds of 
different organisms which have evolved to match certain aspects of that physical 
external universe, and the way in which the physical universe interacts with the 
mind to produce the phenomenal world.” O’Keefe and Nadel “The Hippocampus 
as a Cognitive Map” 
 
Think of it this way—you can look up a word in the dictionary, but you cannot look 
up a use there, unless there was a video which showed before and after the event 
and all relevant facts about it. The dictionary is like a morgue full of dead bodies 
but we want to study physiology. Here lies “rose” and here “run” and here “in” 
and here “is” and what is missing is life. Add a photo and it’s a little better: add a 
video and lots better: add a long 3D color hires video with sound and smell and it’s 
getting there. 
 
Part of Wittgenstein’s description of our public psychology included many detailed 
examples of how the sensations and images in my mind don’t carry any epistemic 
weight even for me. How do I know I am eating an apple? My taste and vision 
might be wrong and how to decide? But if I talk about it or write it down and you 
say “that’s a tasty looking apple” etc. I have an objective test. Right and wrong get 
a foothold here. 
 
W was going to use a quote from Goethe as the motto of PI --“In the beginning was 
the deed.” That is, evolutionarily it was perceptions and actions and then memories 
of them and then thoughts about them and then words voicing the thoughts. So, the 
event is the thing Australopithecus thought about, and natural selection for being 
able to make acoustic blasts, which substituted for them, was strong enough to 
modify our vocal apparatus and suitable control circuitry at a fantastic pace, so by 
early Neanderthal time they were talking a blue streak and have not shut up mind 
or mouth for more than a few minutes since. W understood, as few have, the 
primacy of actions and the irrelevance of our thoughts, feelings etc. as the 
foundations of communication, which is why he is often called a behaviorist (i.e., 
Dennett, Hofstadter, B.F. Skinner style denial of the reality of our mental life, mind, 
consciousness etc.) but this is patently absurd. 
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It reminds me of the famous description by Plato of the shadows on the cave wall 
vs turning around to see people actually using language—an analogy that I never 
thought of in regard to W and which I was stunned to see a few hours later in 
Pinker’s last chapter. In any case if one considers carefully any case of language use, 
we see that much of our intentional psychology is called into play. 
 
One can see the ignorance of Wittgenstein in the articles in EEL2 (the Elsevier 
Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics-2nd ed. (2005) 12,353p- yes that’s 12 
thousand pages in 14 vols and a mere $6000,) which is by far the biggest, and one 
hopes the most authoritative, reference in language studies. 
 
Curiously, Pinker does not have a single reference to it, but you can find it, along 
with nearly all of Pinker, Searle, Wittgenstein and thousands of others free on the 
net. 
 
To get a grasp of the basic necessities for AI you might e.g., find it much more 
interesting to read W’s RFM than Minsky’s ‘The Emotion Machine’. Pinker has 
referred to Brown’s famous list of hundreds of universals of human behavior, but 
these are nearly all gross higher level behaviors such as the possession of religion, 
reciprocal altruisms etc. and it large omits hundreds of other universals which 
underlie these. Wittgenstein was the first, and in some cases perhaps the only one 
to date, to point out many of the more fundamental ones. However, he did not tell 
you what he was doing and nobody else has either so you will have to puzzle it out 
for yourself. Most people read first (and often nothing else) his Philosophical 
Investigations but I prefer the more strictly mathematical examples in his Remarks 
on the Foundations of Mathematics or his Lectures on the Foundations of 
Mathematics. If you read with the understanding that he is describing the universal 
axioms of our evolutionary psychology which, underlie all our reasoning, then his 
work makes perfect sense and is breathtaking in its ingenuity. 
 
Pinker illustrates how the mind works with the Barbecue Sauce example. There are 
of course a limitless number of others which illustrate our subjective probability 
(often called Bayesian reasoning—though he does not mention this). My favorites 
are Doomsday (see e.g., Bostrum’s book or web page), Sleeping Beauty and 
Newcomb’s problem. Unlike Barbecue, which has a clear solution, many others 
have (depending on your viewpoint) one, none or many. We may regard these as 
interesting, as they show gaps in or limits to our rationality (a major theme in 
Wittgenstein) or (what we have known at least since de Finetti’s work in the 20’s) 
that all probability is subjective, or like the famous liar paradox or Godel’s theorems 
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(see my reviews of Hofstadter’s ‘I am a Strange Loop and Yanofsky’s ‘Beyond the 
Limits of Thought’), as trivial demonstrations of the limits of our primate mind, 
though Pinker does not expand on this issue nor give more than a few hints at the 
vast literature on decision theory, game theory, behavioral economics, Bayesianism 
etc. 
 
EEL2 does have a passable short article on W which avoids making too many 
glaring errors, but it totally misses nearly everything of importance, which, if really 
understood, would make the article by far the longest one in the book. Nearly the 
whole thing is wasted on the Tractatus, which everyone knows he totally rejected 
later and which is extremely confused and confusing as well. Hardly anything on 
his later philosophy and not a word about the two searchable CDROM’s which are 
now the starting point for all W scholars (and anyone interested in human behavior) 
which are now becoming widely disseminated freely via the net. There is also 
nothing here nor in the articles about Chomsky, innate ideas , evolution of syntax, 
evolution of semantics, evolution of pragmatics (practically every one of his 20,000 
pages has to do with novel ideas and examples on these two), schema theory etc., 
nor about how he anticipated Chomsky in studying “depth grammar”, described 
the problem of underdetermination or combinatorial explosion,   nor a word about 
his discovery (repeatedly and in detail—e.g., RPP Vol. 2 p20) some 20 years before 
Wason of the reasons for “glitches” in “if p then q” types of constructions now 
analyzed by the Wason selection tests (one of the standard tools of EP research), nor 
about how his work can be seen as anticipating many ideas in evolutionary 
psychology, about his founding the modern study of intentionality, of dispositions 
as actions, of the epiphenomenality of our mental life and of the unity of language, 
math, geometry, music, art and games, nor even an explanation of what he meant 
by language games and grammar—two of his most frequently used terms. W made 
the change from trying to understand the mind as a logical, domain general 
structure to a psychological idiosyncratic domain specific one in the late 20’s but 
Kahneman got the Nobel for it in 2002, for numerous reasons, not the least of which 
is that they did lab work and statistical analysis (though W was a superb 
experimentalist and quite good at math). Of course, one cannot fault the EEL2 too 
much as it merely follows the similar omissions and lack of understanding 
throughout the behavioral sciences. And, I am not bringing this up in the way one 
might complain about the absence of info on ancient Chinese war rockets in a book 
on rocket engines, but because his work is still a virtually untapped mine of 
behavioral science diamonds, and, for my money, some of the most exhilarating 
and eye opening prose I have ever read. Nearly anything he has written could be 
used as a supplementary text or lab manual in any philosophy or psychology class 
and in much of law, mathematics, literature, behavioral economics, history, politics, 
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anthropology, sociology and of course linguistics.  
Which brings us back to Pinker. 
 
In the last chapter, using the famous metaphor of Plato’s cave, he beautifully 
summarizes the book with an overview of how the mind (language, thought, 
intentional psychology) – a product of blind selfishness, moderated only slightly by 
automated altruism for close relatives carrying copies of our genes (Inclusive 
Fitness)--works automatically, but tries to end on an upbeat note by giving us hope 
that we can nevertheless employ its vast capabilities to cooperate and make the 
world a decent place to live. I doubt this very much (see my review of his ‘The Better 
Angels of Our Nature).  
 
Pinker is certainly aware of, but says little about the fact that far more about our 
psychology is left out than included. Among windows into human nature that are 
left out or given minimal attention are math and geometry, music and sounds, 
images, events and causality, ontology (classes of things), dispositions (believing, 
thinking, judging, intending etc.) and the rest of intentional psychology of action, 
neurotransmitters and entheogens, spiritual states (e.g., satori and enlightenment, 
brain stimulation and recording, brain damage and behavioral deficits and 
disorders, games and sports, decision theory (including game theory and 
behavioral economics), animal behavior (very little language but a billion years of 
shared genetics). Many books have been written about each of these areas of 
intentional psychology. The data in this book are descriptions, not explanations that 
show why our brains do it this way or how it is done. How do we know to use the 
sentences in their various ways (i.e., know all their meanings)? This is evolutionary 
psychology that operates at a more basic level –the level where Wittgenstein is most 
active.  And there is scant attention to context which is critical to understanding 
language and in which Wittgenstein was the major pioneer. 
 
Among the countless books not referred to here are Guerino Mazzola’s excellent 
tome investigating the similarity of math and music ‘The Topos of Music’, Shulgin’s 
amazing work probing the mind with psychochemicals ‘Phikal’ and ‘Tikal’. Many 
others try to represent mental functions with geometrical or mathematical means 
such as Rott ‘Belief Revision’, Gardenfors various books, and of course the massive 
efforts going on in logic (e.g. the 20 or so Vol Handbook of Philosophical Logic) as 
well as many others edited or written by the amazing Dov Gabbay (e.g., ‘Temporal 
Logic’). Re spatial language-of the numerous volumes on the psychology, language 
or philosophy of space, the recent ‘Handbook of Spatial Logic’ (especially fun are 
Chap 11 on space-time and the last Chap. by Varzi) stands out. The point is that 
these logical, geometrical and mathematical works are extensions of our innate 
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axiomatic psychology, and so they show in their equations and graphics something 
about the ‘shape’ or ‘form’ or ‘function’ of our thoughts (modules, templates, 
inference engines), and so also the shape of those of animals and even perhaps of 
computers (though one has to think of what test would be relevant here!). And of 
course. all the works of Wittgenstein, keeping in mind that he is sometimes talking 
about the most basic prelinguistic or even premammalian levels of thought and 
perception. Of course, many books on AI, robot navigation and image processing 
are relevant as they must mimic our psychology. Face recognition is one of our most 
striking abilities (though even crustaceans can do it) and the best recent work I 
know is ‘Handbook of Face Recognition’. Of the numerous books on space/time one 
can start with Klein’s ‘Language and Time’ or McLure’s ‘The Philosophy of Time’. 
Smith’s ‘Language and Time’, Hawley’s ‘How Things Persist’ and Sider’s ‘Four- 
Dimensionalism’, Ludlow’s ‘Semantics, Tense and Time’ , Dainton’s ‘Time and 
Space’.and ‘Unity of Consciousness’, Diek’s ‘The Ontology of Spacetime’ and 
Sattig’s ‘The Language and Reality of Time”. But as one would expect, and as 
detailed by Rupert Read, the language games here are all tangled up and most of 
the discussions of time are hopelessly incoherent. 
 
And also a good but now dated book covering much of relevance with articles by 
Searle and others is Vanderveken’s  ‘Logic, Thought and Action’. 
 
